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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20010458SC

v,
PETER VICTOR MONTOYA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from convictions for one count of murder,
a first degree felony, and two counts of attempted murder, a
second degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying

defendant's motion for a new trial where the court determined
that defendant's "newly-discovered" evidence could have been
discovered before trial with reasonable diligence and where, in
any event, the evidence was inadmissible hearsay?
"[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of
discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a
clear abuse of discretion."

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222

1

(Utah 1985) (citation omitted); 'accord State v. Martin, 1999 UT
72, 55, 984 P.2d 975 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860
P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993)).
2.

Was defendant's trial counsel constitutionally

ineffective when, for strategic reasons, he did not pursue two
witnesses whose testimony, had it been timely discovered, would
nonetheless have been inadmissible?
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.
687 (1984).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

The claim presents a question of law, reviewed on

the available record of the underlying proceedings.

State v.

Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 1 26, 12 P.3d 92, 101.
3.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for

a directed verdict where the State adduced believable evidence
that defendant fired the shot that killed the victim?
"When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of a
motion for directed verdict, we review *the evidence and all
reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain
the denial if reasonable minds could disagree with the ground
asserted for directing a verdict.'" Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104,
116, 990 P.2d 933 (citations omitted); accord Cook Associates,

2

Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
No constitutional provision, statute, or rule is
dispositive.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following a shooting, defendant was charged by information
with one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder (R.
3-5).

At trial, after the State presented its case-in-chief,

defendant moved for a directed verdict (R. 386: 32). The court
deferred consideration of the motion until the trial concluded,
and defendant presented his case.

Following all the evidence,

defendant moved to dismiss (Id. at 42). The court took the
motion under advisement (Id. at 59).
A jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 242-44).

At a

subsequent hearing, the trial court considered and then denied
defendants' motions for a directed verdict and to dismiss (R.
387: 37-39 or addendum A ) .
The court sentenced defendant to five years to life on the
first degree felony and one-to-fifteen years on each of the
second degree felonies.

The court also imposed one-year firearm

enhancements on each count and ordered all three sentences to run
consecutively (R. 271-73).

Finally, the court imposed fines,

fees, and restitution (Id.).
Defendant moved for a new trial (R. 275). Following a
3

hearing, the court denied the motion (R. 347-52 or addendum B; R.
357-61 or addendum C ) •

Defendant then filed this timely appeal

(R. 363).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Late on a May night in 1997, Kelly Seal, age 16, drove his
15-year-old brother, Matt, and his 19-year-old friend, Greg, to
Beck Street to watch drag races (R. 384: 24-25).

Greg described

the outing as "heading out to have fun in the night with guys,
heading out cruising the streets, picking up girls, going to see
vehicles" (R. 385: 43).
In the course of the evening, the boys stopped at a
combination Amoco station and Rainbo Mart on Beck Street to buy
drinks and use the restroom (R. 384: 27, 29). There, they ran
into a friend of Greg's and so stopped to talk with him and
admire his vehicle (R. 384: 29-30; R. 385: 58). While they were
so engaged, Matt's attention was diverted by a red, four-by-four,
stick shift, GMC king cab truck whose driver, Russell Thornwall,
"squealed the tires" while backing up to change the position of
the truck relative to the gas pumps1 (R. 384: 31-32, 49, 70, 85).
Glancing over moments later, Matt saw Thornwall get out of the
truck and begin pumping gas (Id. at 32). Matt testified that he
remembered Thornwall "throwing up his hands" and yelling, "VLT,"

1

Thornwall had apparently pulled up on the wrong side of
the gas pumps, given the location of the truck's gas tank (R.
384: 72-74; R. 385: 111).
4

which Matt knew was a gang reference (Id. at 33-34).

The boys

tried to ignore the apparent threat and soon got back in their
car and left the gas station (Id. at 35). 2
As the boys started to drive back to the races, Kelly
received a page or realized that he had forgotten to return a
page (R. 384: 36, 48; R. 385: 57, 60, 98). Either way, the boys
returned to the Amoco/Rainbo Mart to use the telephone (R. 385:
60).

Kelly pulled the Honda Civic up to the pay phones, located

about twenty feet from the Rainbo Mart, and approached the phone,
where he was joined by Greg (R. 384: 26, 36-37, 48; R. 385: 61).
Matt could hear Thornwall still yelling and so stayed in the car,
seated in the middle of the back seat, avoiding any contact with
him (R. 384: 38, 81). Greg, standing by the phones, made eye
contact with Thornwall as he was pumping gas.

Thornwall threw

his hands up in the air in a "what are you looking at type
gesture" (R. 385: 63). Greg, feeling threatened by the man's
apparent anger and aggressiveness, urged Kelly to get off the
phone (IcL_ at 63-64, 98-99).
Kelly and Greg returned to the Honda.

By this time,

Thornwall had moved the red truck from the gas pumps and driven

2

The parties stipulated that the driver of the truck was
Russell Thornwall (R. 385: 82). Days before the preliminary
hearing in this case, Thornwall became the subject of a felony
stop. Fleeing the police, Thornwall fired multiple rounds at an
officer, then ran behind a building and shot himself fatally in
the head (Id^at 136-38).
5

around behind the boys' vehicle, stopping "a couple of car
lengths" away (R. 384: 39, 49, 83; R. 385: 64). Thornwall revved
the engine (R. 384: 83-84; R. 385: 61). Matt quickly glanced
back from the middle of the back seat and saw both Thornwall and
a middle passenger in the truck.3

Matt also noticed that the

front passenger side door was open (R. 384: 39-40, 87). When he
glanced back a second time, he saw defendant, who had just left
the Rainbo Mart, walk past the back of the Honda, get into the
truck, and close the door (Id. at 40, 42-43, 83-86).
The boys all had the same thought - to leave (Id. at 44).
Kelly backed the Honda up and then drove parallel to the front of
the Rainbo Mart on his way towards the Beck Street exit (R. 384:
44, 49-50; R. 385: 67). The red truck followed, coming up along
the right side of the Honda and then swerving towards it (R. 384:
44, 51; R. 385: 6, 67). Kelly quickly responded to prevent a
collision (R. 384: 44; R. 385: 67, 99). At this juncture, both
Thornwall and defendant, who was leaning over Thornwall from the
passenger side and staring intently at the Honda, were repeatedly
yelling "VLT" and "pussies" at the boys (R. 384: 45, 51, 57; R.
385: 31, 67-68, 100).
Kelly approached the exit, with the truck following closely

3

Matt described the middle passenger as Hispanic, with a
shaved head (R. 384: 86). He was unsure whether the passenger
was sitting in the front or back seat of the truck (R. 384: 8687; R. 385: 12). In any event, the man remained unidentified and
did not testify at trial.
6

behind, its lights shining through the Honda's back window into
the smaller and lower vehicle (R. 384: 52-53; R. 385: 69, 80,
103).

The Honda came to a "rolling stop" to cross a dip in the

driveway and was just beginning to turn left onto Beck Street
when Matt and Greg heard shots (R. 384: 54; R. 385: 89, 103).
The back window shattered, and the red truck raced off to the
right, tires squealing, traveling south on Beck Street at high
speed (R. 384: 54-55, 60; R. 385: 74, 103; R. 386: 35). Matt
heard somebody shout, "VLT rules!" (R. 384: 60).
The Honda rolled to a stop in the middle of Beck Street (R.
384: 55; R. 385: 73). Kelly was bleeding from the nose and
throat, coughing up blood (R. 384: 59; R. 385: 71). He died of a
single gunshot wound to the back of the head (R. 385: 48). Greg
was shot in the lower right back but recovered (R. 384: 63; R.
385: 70). Matt was physically unharmed (R. 384: 55-56).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because newlydiscovered evidence established that Russell Thornwall, rather
than defendant, was the shooter.

This argument fails because the

allegedly exculpatory statements could have been discovered with
reasonable diligence before trial.
Defendant offered the testimony of a detective, who had
spoken with a confidential witness who claimed to be the front

7

right passenger in the truck, the only living eyewitness to the
shootings other than defendant.

The confidential witness could

have been discovered with reasonable diligence if defendant had
simply called upon the court to subpoena the witness's
uncooperative mother for further information concerning his
whereabouts.
Defendant also offered the testimony of Jason Thornwall,
Russell's brother and close confidant.
the preliminary hearing.

Russell died just before

Knowing that Russell's death might open

up previously-closed channels of communication and that more time
might lead to the discovery of potentially exculpatory
information, defendant not only did not so inform the court, but
also vigorously opposed the State's request for a trial
continuance.

Had defendant sought the continuance and pursued

Russell's family with reasonable diligence, Jason would have come
to light as Russell's only sibling and the person he most
trusted.
In any event, the "newly-discovered" testimony was
inadmissible and so could not have altered the outcome of
defendant's trial.

First, the statement of the confidential

witness did not qualify for any hearsay exception because he was
not legally unavailable and his statement did not qualify as a
hearsay exception.

The statement was offered for the truth of

the matter asserted yet wholly lacked trustworthiness because it

8

was neither made under oath nor subject to cross-examination.
Further, the identity of the witness was never revealed to the
court.

Second, Russell Thornwall's statement to his brother,

while potentially subject to a hearsay objection, bore no indicia
of reliability.

Additionally, the credibility of the statement

was fatally undermined by Jason's substantial and unexplained
delay in reporting it.

For these reasons, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new
trial.
Defendant next asserts ineffective assistance of counsel,
arguing that: 1) if the testimony could have been produced with
reasonable diligence at trial, then his counsel performed
deficiently by failing to discover it; and 2) he was prejudiced
because the statements likely would have produced a different
trial outcome.

Counsel will only be found to have performed

deficiently when "no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy
can be surmised from counsel's action."
P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993).

State v. Tennyson/ 850

Here, defendant strategically

chose to try his case based primarily on circumstantial evidence
that he reasonably believed was sufficient for him to prevail and
that did not involve the risk of producing a potentially adverse
witness.

In any event, because the statements of both the

confidential witness and of Jason Thornwall were inadmissible,
they could not affect the outcome of the case.

9

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict.

He contends that the

evidence was so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter.

The

evidence, however, was amenable to two interpretations, and the
jury chose to accept the State's interpretation over defendant's.
Because this choice reflects on the weight of the evidence rather
than its legal sufficiency, the trial court did not err in
denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WHERE THE
PROPOSED TESTIMONY COULD HAVE BEEN
DISCOVERED PRIOR TO TRIAL WITH
REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND WHERE THE
TESTIMONY WAS INADMISSIBLE AND SO
COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE OUTCOME
OF THE TRIAL
Defendant asserts that the court should have granted him a
new trial on the grounds of newly-discovered evidence.
Specifically, he asserts that information provided by two
individuals - the first, a confidential witness who claimed to be
the right front passenger in the truck and the second, Russell
Thornwall's brother and confidant, Jason - would have established
that Russell Thornwall, rather than defendant, was the shooter
(Br. of Aplt. at 22-23; R. 276-80).

10

A trial court may grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there was any impropriety in the initial trial that
had a substantially adverse effect on the rights of a party.
Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a).

For defendant to prevail on a motion for

new trial based on newly-discovered evidence, his evidence must
meet three criteria:
(1) It must be such as could not with
reasonable diligence have been discovered and
produced at trial;
(2) It must not be merely cumulative;
(3) It must be such as to render a different
result probable on the retrial of the case.
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991); accord State v.
Loose, 2000 UT 11, 1 16, 994 P.2d 1237. Notably,

XM

[n]ew

evidence' is not evidence which was available to defendant but
not obtained by him prior to the time of trial. Nor is it
evidence that he knew about or could have discovered prior to
trial."

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah

1985) (citations omitted).

In reviewing a trial court's decision

to deny a motion for new trial, this Court "presume[s] that the
discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the
record clearly shows the contrary."

Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d

530, 534-35 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted).

To constitute an

abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination must be
"beyond the limits of reasonability."

State v. Hamilton, 827

P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992).
Here, following a hearing at which both Jason Thornwall and
11

a detective who had spoken to the unnamed confidential witness
testified, the trial court concluded that neither the first nor
third criteria for prevailing on a new trial motion based on
newly-discovered evidence had been met (R. 347-51 at addendum B;
R. 357-61 at addendum C).
First, the trial court determined that defendant had not
exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing discovery.

Indeed,

the court noted, "the defense had a number of options in pursuing
the discovery of the confidential witness and Mr. Thornwall, but
failed to exercise them" (R. 348 at addendum A) .4 (R. 348) .
Second, the trial court determined that even if the evidence
had been discovered in a timely fashion, it was inadmissible and
so could not have rendered a different result probable on retrial
(R. 349, 360-61).

The confidential witness, by failing to

establish that he was legally "unavailable," could not fit within
a hearsay exception pursuant to rule 804 (R. 349-50, 360). And
Jason Thornwall's testimony, while potentially falling within the
hearsay exception for statements against interest, was also

4

The court particularly noted that when the State
requested a continuance, defendant had not acquiesced to use the
time for further discovery, but instead had vehemently opposed
the motion (R. 348). Defendant argued that a continuation would
have been futile because all avenues of investigation had been
pursued. The court disagreed, noting that the defense could have
sought the court's assistance in compelling the confidential
witness's mother to be deposed under oath and that Jason
Thornwall, Russell's only sibling, "would have been a natural
source of investigation" (R. 348-49 at addendum B).
12

ultimately inadmissible because it lacked any indicia of
substantive trustworthiness (R. 350-51, 360).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.
A.

No Reasonable Diligence
The evidence supports the trial court's ruling that, by

exercising reasonable diligence, defendant could have discovered
the evidence before trial. As to the confidential witness,
defendant plainly knew his identity from the outset.

They were,

after all, together in the red truck at the time of the shooting.
Indeed, the confidential witness was the only living person,
other than defendant, who knew exactly what happened that night.
From defendant's perspective, if Russell Thornwall was
indeed the shooter, then the confidential witness would have been
a critical exculpatory witness for defendant.

The witness could

have provided direct evidence that Thornwall was the shooter and,
by so doing, significantly strengthened defendant's likelihood of
prevailing in what was otherwise a primarily circumstantial case.
And if the confidential witness was himself the shooter,
defendant's best interest would plainly have been served by
pursuing him with the utmost aggressiveness.

If, however,

defendant was the shooter, then it would have been in defendant's
best interest for the confidential witness - the only other
living eyewitness to the murder - not to be located before trial.
Defense counsel had spoken to the confidential witness's

13

mother on several occasions and reported to the court that "[t]he
mother stated to us that she would not tell us - or she stated I
don't know where he lives, I will try to get a message to him for
you, that sort of thing, that he is out of the state, and he has
put all of this behind him, and he is not part of that anymore"
(R. 388: 20). Given the uncooperative nature of the witness's
mother, defendant had two choices - either ask the court to
subpoena the mother for a deposition under oath to ascertain more
about the confidential witness's whereabouts, or forego pursuit
of the witness.

Where the witness might well implicate defendant

and where defendant had developed a viable defense based on
circumstantial evidence, he did not further pursue the witness.
This conduct, however, does not preclude the likelihood that
defendant, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered and
produced the witness before trial, had defendant thought it was
in his best interest to do so.
The record also supports the trial court's determination
that defendant, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered
the testimony of Jason Thornwall before trial.

Jason testified

at the hearing on the new trial motion that he talked with
Russell daily, that they were close friends, that he often bailed
Russell out when Russell ran into trouble with the law, and that
"everybody knows" that he was the only person Russell trusted (R.
388: 75-79).

14

According to defense counsel, who was not assigned to the
•v..~

• 1 late September, Russell Thornwa 1

oeen

urr subject of extensive investigate-..

(Id. ^

in-ii

" .;

- family had not;
t

_

^1

'pit^

1

re determine :r he had ^riv helpful information
r

• • •

-] - ]

-

,on -ussell Thornwall died, counsel

contacted r_:i„ . _.:

until November,

-

Om*

: leads (Id. at
iri incommunicado

.'• November, ju^t after tne trial

ii'i u ~ provide defense c ^ ' m ^ l

i H

- th the name that led

lie contao; A. i ,i Jason i^^..,ji, A^I t:,- .:3Lt:^ii;

ii

here (Id. =>r
-a
investigated ^.1 that Thornwall's deatr mi

.t open up channels of
:f=-f-r,d-:r * cnuse

i: > T O interna

r

.-

-.i*

\

-ie or Liiat he —--*
M;U;I

~.

-K^n«

-H0

i'hornwaLi .b counsel was temporarily
K

-

proceed d^ie^, . , *._

^

informatics.
:, .

J;

.

moti^ n hv t-h^ ^at-p that w.-^id nave given m m

I..U.'J-/

Instead,
oppos-\- a

the time necessary

choice, however, does not alter the tact that, witn reasonable
:^n>

••.-••-•ace to the State's motion, he ^~^ld

have garnereu ine Lime iiecessary t~ discover Jason T h o r n w a ^ .;
testimony before trial began.

15

B.

Different Result Not Probable On Retrial
The trial court also correctly determined that even if the

testimony of both witnesses had been discovered before trial, it
was inadmissible and so could not have made any difference to the
outcome of defendant's trial.
From the outset, the statement of the confidential witness
failed to meet the threshold requirement for qualifying as an
exception to the hearsay rule.

That is, the declarant of the

statement, the confidential witness, was not "unavailable as a
witness," as that term is used in the evidentiary rule governing
hearsay exceptions.

See Utah R. Evid. 804(a). 5

A witness will

not be declared unavailable simply because his counsel asserts,
as he did here, that the witness was "frightened to come forward"
(R. 278).

See, e.g.. State v. White, 671 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah

1983)(attorney for a witness cannot claim privilege against selfincrimination; witness must appear and claim privilege personally
in order to be declared unavailable pursuant to evidentiary
rule).
Because the confidential witness did not meet the threshold

The subcategories of rule 804 (a) all require some
interaction between the declarant and the court or judicial
process in order to establish the "unavailability" of the witness
for purposes of the rule. The single exception is the
subcategory that renders legally unavailable one who "is unable
to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity." Utah R.
Evid. 804 (a) (4) .
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requirement of unavailability as a witness, nis testimony cannot
fa1. ] --*-vw, the amb I r M 'Me except inns outlined
iriGu-j, - ^

statement; is p~:_. J. ;:' .-. ,

•• _i:

J#

• rule 804,
: . • • ite

trnt-f r>r "he matter asserted, but wholly lacking
•- '

subject to cross-examination.
P. 2d 388

~:I: :i i ior

See, e.g., State v. Sibert, 310

390 (I J.t : : .1 ] 957) (e.xp] a\-:-

-. essential purposes of

hearsay rule).
Jason Thornwa! IV- statement that Russell told '"im chat
defendant was i
inadmissible-

. . :..JT something i-.u^-e-

. :0

Although Russell Thornwall's death rendered him

be admitted it : * fell witu:r an exception to trie hearsay rule.
-> w •

• •:*-.-.-nt -gainst interest,

proviaes:
(3) Statement against interest. i \ statement
which
at the time of its making
so far tended to subject the declarant to . .
. criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would not
have made the statement unless believing it
to be true. A statement tending to expose
the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstaiices
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.

statement to , • ->> arguably qualities as a statement against
interest insofar as the statement, when it was made, might have
17

subjected Russell to criminal liability if Jason revealed it.
Nonetheless, Russell's statement to Jason is rendered
inadmissible by the last requirement of the subsection.

That is,

"corroborating circumstances clearly indicating] the
trustworthiness of the statement" are wholly absent.

Indeed, the

delay surrounding the statement demonstrably undermines its
credibility.
According to Jason's affidavit and testimony at the new
trial hearing, Russell told him that "[defendant] is in jail for
something I did" (R. 388: 71; R. 288-89).

Russell made his

alleged statement to Jason in August or September of 1999.

Yet

Jason did not come forward with the statement until some fourteen
months later, remaining silent after his brother's death and
through the trial, conviction, and imprisonment of his brother's
close friend.
Part of the delay in reporting is understandable.

That is,

Jason would have been unlikely to come forward with information
incriminating his brother out of familial loyalty while his
brother was still alive and subject to criminal prosecution.
Once Russell died, however, Jason had no reason to protect him,
especially at the direct expense of defendant, who had been
Russell's close friend for 10 years (R. 388: 75-76).
In his testimony at the new trial hearing, Jason stated
emphatically that he contacted defendant's counsel because "I
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didn'*- want anybody paying time for »nat mv ^rotnei
is r.r^

i^l

It

fair f~ v somebody to sp^nd their whole life :n orison

sometning my , .otne:
believed this

' .*' ;

f~r

.: . i -•
-. l i f e " (Id. a t 7 9)

Wl len the court asked

: 1: 1 = po ] i ::e a f t e r Ri i s s e'.
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them, that defendant had been charged with .a crime he didr i't
-j"" i----1-•-d . offering no explanation and merely

i "

saying,. "I got really depressed when he died.

I d^n I know, your

H o n o r " (Id^ at 9 4 ) .
This substantia^ ai:a L.I-•_-•.[-- i-i . * ; . J
would have been exculpatory information defeats the requirement

trustworthiness of a hearsay statement against
nere

•

interest :i\

prohibition Jason ~ ™ T h3rTo

leiL duuut approaching the police w^ih incriminating
about hi c b r o t h e r ' Q - t a t e m e n r
Jason _ „t^i_:.._.j

xr.iwiiTuit-L.on

' r r-:i • *^f-n Russell dien

i

_*_:i-

^rder

v

. -^g MU

^t
/

surfaced ir. January of 2001, fourteen months after . *' was
-

•

-

•

i

after defendant was convicted.
indicia of tr , rt-wor h h i .r rtPr
that

Because trie testimony bear^ r.c

f

"he trial c^ur*

correctly

determined

+• w a s i ^ a a m i s s i L ^ ~u..«, accora.i.^ 2 , ..a :.::. .utuse its

discretion in denying defendant's m o t i o n for a new trial.

19

POINT TWO
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE HE
STRATEGICALLY CHOSE NOT TO
AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE EITHER THE
CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS OR LEADS
RELATED TO RUSSELL THORNWALL AND
BECAUSE THE INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY
COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE OUTCOME
OF HIS TRIAL
Defendant alleges that if the testimony of the confidential
witness and of Jason Thornwall could have been produced with
reasonable efforts prior to trial, then his counsel performed
deficiently by failing to exercise reasonable diligence in
discovering it (Br. of Aplt. at 26). He further contends that he
was prejudiced by this deficient performance because the
testimony would likely have produced a different trial outcome
(Id. at 29-30).
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was so
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.

Strickland v. Washington, 4 66 U.S.

668, 694 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah
1990).

In this case, defendant's claims fails on both prongs of

the ineffectiveness analysis.
First, as to deficient performance, when reviewing trial
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counsel/s performance, "a[n appellate] court must indulge a
s'

-u counsel's conduct fall 0 ••.'*rh-:n ^b^ wide

t* :

rang*- oi reasonable professioiicn assistance.
9A"> " " i " C 1

- -'

' j'

•

State v. Taylor,

Tinti no Strickland v. Washington,

4,

. -• _ . n^

ujibt'i s

.- .is i

performance can be articulated [this Court! will assume counsel
u-.. -

t

— *

,

App. 1993
<:

>. a .^ . . r^niiyo^.
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168 (( Jt .ah

.^effective assistance claim, succeeds only
• -- • ^

rt-lcs or strategy can be

surmised from counsel's actions."

Id.

Here, defendant/ s conduct bespeaks a rationa 1 trial strategy
that Li.ij Jw,..„

4

no pos..i.,j, t-n second gues:- .

defense r-n\]r\^?

^hosp nM

;

: -;r---ue -he

:SL,

confidential witness's

and whose deposition could have been compelled h\

the trial
Counsel's

silence on the matter strongly sugge^t^ ttiai

he suspected the

confidential v;:*-^^*? w^:1ri provide tes^imon^' damaqinn t-def en^a;:: , rat:^i Li.a:. ;.._-

r:\ * •• r : •;. __ .

that Russell Thornwall was the shooter

_, :• . -.

therefore,

evidence, which he reasonably r.;' miscaKeniy believea wuuid
n

i- i ~urr: 'ienL bdbib iui acauittal.
Second, twelve days befoxe trial was scheduled to begin, the
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State moved for a continuance (R. 388: 14, 38). Rather than
stipulating to the continuance to gain time for additional
investigation, defendant vigorously opposed the motion,
apparently anxious to go to trial at the earliest possible date.
In trying to explain why he did not accede to the continuance in
order to further pursue the confidential witness, counsel offered
that "we had no idea what [the witness] was going to say" (R. 388
at 20).
Realistically, the confidential witness could have testified
in only one of three ways: he could invoke his privilege against
self-incrimination; he could testify that Russell Thornwall was
the shooter; or he could testify that defendant was the shooter.
Counsel's vigorous opposition to the motion, coupled with the
limited nature of his efforts to locate the only other eyewitness
to the shooting, together suggest an intentional choice to
proceed in the confidential witness's absence as a matter of
trial strategy.

See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 470 (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); State v. Pascual, 804

P.2d 553,

556 (Utah App. 1991)(in context of ineffective assistance of
counsel, appellate court will not second guess legitimate trial
strategy).
Similarly, defendant's choice to proceed to trial
immediately rather than to use the State's continuance request as
an opportunity to further investigate leads from Russell
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Thornwal"' - attorney suggests that defendant was confident in his
4

'-•" -hooter.

Having decided on that

strategy and o e i i e v m y tudi the physical evidence established a
convincing circumstantial case, he saw i io reason to pursue the
matter further.
Second, ^ c •'^ prejudice*, the statements of the confidential
witness and -:

• —

been discussed at length ir. Point One.

.-

L-^L^,

Consequently/ the

evidence could njt affect the outcome ot tne case.
^~ -

-

. mr^T i ,r * '

necessarily
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For these

--.effective assistance of counsel claim

fans.
INT THREE
THE TRIAL U U U K X L U K K ^ U I I , ! DENIr >
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIREClnu
VERDICT BECAUSE THE STATE HAD
PRODUCED BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE THAT ,
HE WAS T P P ^nr^rppp

Defendant argues that t. r.e evidence th :l he was the shooter
entertained a
reasonable
(Br.

doubt

of A p l t .

at

t r i d t ii<=
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w i r-

' L'j

i . i i U i v i \u U ci -
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h o t Kel~ y .,.-._l
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Additionally, defei: idai it argues for the firs.- La.:ae on
appeal that, even if the evidence sufficed to establish that he
was the shooter, no evidence supported his intent to kill either
of the passengers (Br. of Aplt. at 3 7 ) . However, "[w]ith limited
exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline
consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal."
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 7 97 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah
23

"When a motion for a directed verdict is made at the close
of the State's case, the trial court should dismiss the charge if
the State did not establish a prima facie case against the
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the elements
of the crime charged.'"

State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah

1992) (quoting State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983)).
If, however, "'the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge is
required to submit the case to the jury for determination of the
guilt or innocence of defendant.'" State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d
1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Iverson, 10 Utah 2d
171, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (I960)).

In evaluating a motion for

directed verdict, the trial court views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.

Merino v. Albertson's, Inc.,

1999 UT 14, 1 3, 975 P.2d 467.
In this case, after a hearing, the trial court denied
defendant's motion, stating:
It would have been better if we had somebody
that said [defendant] fired the gun, or
[defendant] didn't fire the gun. Well, sure.

1990). Absent exceptional circumstances or plain error, neither
of which defendant has asserted here, he has waived consideration
of whether the State made a prima facie showing of his intent to
kill the two passengers. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)(declining to address defendant's unpreserved
claims, where defendant asserted neither plain error nor
exceptional circumstances on appeal).
24

But circumstantial evidence is a reasonable
method of proof, and that's what this case
was.
As far as who actually fired the
weapon, it was a circumstantial case.
And as you look a t tl: le evidence, particularly
in the view of the way the State chooses to
present i t, it's just as logical, if not more
logical, that [defendant] fi red the weapon as
Mr. Thornwall. So I can't dismiss the case
nor can I grant the directed verdict 01 i tl: le
state of the evidence, and I decline to do
so

The moti on is denied :i n 1 ts entirety.

38 7 at 3 9 or addendum A) . •
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<
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1i

'iffirming second degree

murder conviction based on circumstantial evidence); State v.
John, 586 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1978)(affirming manslaughter
conviction where only circumstantial evidence pointed to
defendant).
During its case-in-chief, the State adduced believable,
evidence that defendant was the shooter.

The evidence was

undisputed that Russell Thornwall initiated the fatal encounter,
that he was driving the truck, that the truck's stick shift was
located to Russell's right, and that Russell was right-handed.
In addition, the evidence was uncontroverted that defendant was a
front seat passenger in the truck at the time of the shooting,
that defendant was leaned over Thornwall to shout threats at the
victims, and that the shots were fired from the truck (R. 384 at
33, 40, 45, 54, 57, 78; R. 385 at 62, 67, 68, 70, 165, 169, 17879) .
The only area of significant dispute between the parties was
the inference to be gleaned from two shell casings found on the
roadway after the shooting had occurred and the truck had sped
away.

Based on the testimony of a Salt Lake City police homicide

detective and a Utah Highway Patrol metro gang unit officer, the
State argued that the position of the casings indicated that
defendant had shot the weapon out of the right front passenger
side window (R. 386: 67-71).

This conclusion was bolstered by

the inference that Thornwall, who was right-handed, could not
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have fired the shots, especially with such accurac
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sufficiency of the evidence, to which a morion for directed
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* on the weight ur * k " ~hvsical

evidence, including which interpretation of that evidence the
4

":"Y found most plausible.

The trial court emphasized this

distinction, stating:
If there was sufficient evidence • o proceed
forward after the State had rested and after
the case in its entirety had been presented
and before submitting it to the jury, then
•that's the only issue I decide, the basic
sufficiency of the evidence. Whether the
jury finds one witness more persuasive than
another or whether it chooses to believe some
evidence or ignore other evidence that they
do not find persuasive 4 ~ *-u~ ----'<-> o ^ i ^
prerogative.
If you wai it me to be the finder • if fact,
don't try [the case] to the jury, But the
defendant has a constitutional right to a
jury and so does the State, and both parties
are entitled to have the matter weighed by
eight impartial folks. And that's what
happened i n this case.
I cannot say that there was not enough
evidence to send this matter to the jury
e : *•u^r at the conclusion of the State' c
27

or at the conclusion of all of the evidence
in the case. There was sufficient evidence
to allow the jury to make that determination.
(R. 387 at 38-39 or addendum A ) .
In sum, the State established a prima facie case against
defendant by producing evidence which, along with its reasonable
inferences, could provide the basis for finding that defendant
was the shooter.

A jury acting fairly and reasonably could find

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See State v.

Clark, 2001 UT 9, fl 13, 20 P.3d 300 (citations omitted)
(articulating standard for prevailing on a directed verdict
motion).

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in submitting

the case to the jury for a final determination of defendant's
guilt or innocence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction on one count of criminal homicide and two counts of
attempted criminal homicide.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /6

day of January, 2003.

MARK SHURTLEFF
torney General
'
JOANNE C SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

28

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify

O F MAILING

•.:,:'. • .*• . * :. u-

•.. i. :i irate c c pi es • : f 1:1: i ::: •

f o r e a m l n a hri«=-f of a p p e l l e e were m a i l e d f i r s t - c l a s s , p o s t a g e
r;

rtj.. .

i i)

iiij: »]:: : e l l a i 1 t ,

i Ill 6 E = = I:

1500

South, Suite N-N'i, ^ i ' Lake City, Utah 84101 , this i ^ d a y of

29

ADDENDA

Addendum A

Addendum A

First off/ with regard to the notice, I'm satisfied
there was adequate notice. And if there wasn't, there was no
objection, no objection on the record.
What happens in chambers, we talk in there casually.
We talk about a lot of things. And if we're going to start
trying to reconstruct that when it's not on the record, then
we are all going to have to take a different approach to how
we try cases. But in any event, it was not on the record and
didn't happen.

That's the way it is.

But I'm satisfied with the State's position that
there was adequate notice.

This potential theory of party

liability on Mr. Mbntoya, the fact of the matter is, in any
event, the State never really pursued that. And the defense
put on its case saying that someone else was the shooter, at
least made that inference during cross examination and all of
the other things that went on. And I guess the jury didn't
buy it.

So in any event, adequate notice was there.
With regard to the Motion to Dismiss both at the

end of the State's case and at the end of the case in its
entirety, regardless of my opinion on the state of the
evidence as far as its weight, regardless of my opinion on
whether the jury was right or wrong in this case —
don't offer an opinion.

and I

I think I have already said when the

motions were argued initially that I had concerns about the
level of the weight that the State's evidence offered — but
37

Ifm not the fact-finder; the jury was —

so what I think about

the weight of the evidence is totally immaterial unless the
jury verdict is a based upon nothing.

If that's the case, I

wouldn't have sent it to the jury in the first place.
I absolutely refuse to become a trier of fact in a
jury case.

That's not my role and it is not my role to

second-guess the jury.

If there was sufficient evidence to

proceed forward after the State had rested and after the case
in its entirety had been presented and before submitting it to
the jury, then that's the only issue I decide, the basic
sufficiency of the evidence.

Whether the jury finds one

witness more persuasive than another or whether it chooses to
believe some evidence or ignore other evidence that they do
not find persuasive is the jury's sole prerogative.
And that's what happened in this case.

There was

sufficient evidence to go to a jury on this matter, and the
jury chose to believe certain pieces of evidence that they
believe constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Montoya fired the weapon.

And while I may have had some

concerns about whether or not the weight of the evidence was
enough to constitute reasonable doubt, again I have to
emphasize, that's not my role; it's not my role.
If you want me to be the finder of fact, don't try
them to the jury.

But the defendant has a constitutional

right to a jury and so does the State, and both parties are
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entitled to have the matter weighed by eight impartial folks.
And that's what happened in this case.
I cannot say that there was not enough evidence to
send this matter to the jury either at the conclusion of the
State's case or at the conclusion of all of the evidence in
the case.

There was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to

make that determination.
It would have been better if we had somebody that
said Mr. Montoya fired the gun, or Mr. Montoya didn't fire the
gun. Well, sure.

But circumstantial evidence is a reasonable

method of proof, and that's what this case was. As far as who
actually fired the weapon, it was a circumstantial case.
And as you look at the evidence, particularly in the
view of the way the State chooses to present it, it's just as
logical, if not more logical, that Mr. Montoya fired the
weapon as Mr. Thornwall.

So I can't dismiss this case nor can

I grant the directed verdict on the state of the evidence, and
I decline to do so.

The motion is denied in its entirety.

Let the State prepare an appropriate order, please.
MR. CASTLE:
THE COURT:

The State will, your Honor.
Thank you. We'll be in recess.

(These proceedings concluded at 10:10 a.m.)
*

•

*
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Addendum B

Addendum B

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR 0 8 2001

Jtfmm

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THE 8TATB OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE MO. 991910580

vs.
FETE VICTOR MONTOYA,
Defendant.

Before the Court is the defendant's Motion for New Trial.
Counsel for the State and counsel for the defendant appeared on
February 26, 2001, for an evidentiary hearing and to argue their
respective positions. Following oral argument, the Court took the
matter under advisement to further consider the law in light of the
facts adduced at the hearing.

Since taking the Motion under

advisement, the Court has had an opportunity to consider the law,
all relevant pleadings, facts and the oral argument in this case.
Being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum
Decision.

LB9AL MfMrYffH
The defendant has moved for a new trial on the basis that
information

provided

by

Jason

Thornwall

and

informant constitutes newly discovered evidence.

a

confidential

The recent Utah

Supreme Court case of State v. Loose. 994 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Utah
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2000), reiterated "[t]he legal elements for analyzing a claim for
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. . . .: the moving
party must demonstrate from the proffered evidence that: (i) it
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and
produced at the trial; (ii) it is not merely cumulative; and (iii)
it must make a different result probable at retrial."
The Court concludes that the defendant has failed to establish
the first and third of these elements because the defense could
have discovered the evidence with reasonable diligence before trial
and the evidence would not produce a different result at retrial
because it is inadmissible hearsay. Turning first to the diligence
element, the Court agrees with the State that the defense had a
number of options in pursuing the discovery of the confidential
informant and Mr* Thornwall, but failed to exercise them.

The

defense could have easily obtained more time. The defendant merely
had to agree to the State's request for a continuance.

Instead,

the defendant vehemently opposed the State's request, despite the
fact that he could have used that time to continue investigating
the whereabouts of the confidential

informant or to further

interview members of Russell Thornwall's family, including Jason
Thornwall. The defense now contends that a continuance would have
been

futile

explored•

because

every

avenue

of

investigation

had

been

To the contrary, the Court is persuaded that with
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respect to the confidential informant, the defense could have
sought the Court's assistance in compelling the informant's mother,
who apparently knew his whereabouts, to be deposed under oath.
Moreover, Jason Thornwall, Russell Thornwallvs only sibling, would
have been a natural source of investigation, particularly in light
of the information divulged by Natalie Thornwall,

Jason Thornwall

testified that he was easily accessible through his family members,
who knew him as a confidant to his brother.

Therefore, through

reasonable diligence and acquiescing in the State's request for a
continuance, the defendant

could have discovered

and sought

production of Jason Thornwallfs and the confidential informant's
statements.
However, even if the defendant had discovered these statements
prior to trial, the Court concludes that they are inadmissible
hearsay and would therefore not have affected the outcome of the
trial.

Defense

counsel

argued

at

the

hearing

that

the

confidential informant would likely invoke his right to silence if
called at trial.

According to the defense, he would therefore

become "unavailable* under Utah Rule of Evidence 804 and his prior
statements to Mr. Couch would come in as "statements against
interest" because those statements would place him in the passenger
seat of the truck, thought by the State to be occupied by the
shooter.

However, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. White. 671

STATE V. MONTOYA
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P.2d 191 (Utah 1983), pointed out that only when a witness has
personally asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege under oath would
he be considered "unavailable."

Since the confidential informant

has not done so in this case, he cannot legally be considered
unavailable. Moreover, the confidential informant's statement that
he was in the front passenger seat is not truly a statement against
interest because it does not admit anything, i.e., actually being
the shooter.

Furthermore, as the State points out, since this

statement is made under the shroud of anonymity, the confidential
informant cannot be subjected to criminal liability because of his
statement.

Finally, the defendant has not produced any evidence

that would corroborate the confidential informant's statement.
Similarly,

the

Court

concludes

that

although

Russell

Thornwall's statement to his brother could be construed as a
statement

against

interest,

the

statement

is

nevertheless

inadmissible because the defendant has not offered any evidence
that would corroborate the trustworthiness of the statement.

To

the contrary^ Jason Thornwall's delay in reporting his brother's
statement to the police after his brother's death makes the
statement

suspect.

Specifically, while Jason may have felt

prohibited from going to the police with incriminating information
about his brother, this prohibition clearly lifted with Russell
Thornwall's death.

Furthermore, despite his acknowledged belief
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that an individual should not suffer for someone else's misdeeds,
Jason Thornwall remained silent while the defendant, his apparent
friend and an individual for whom he felt loyalty, was convicted
and sent to prison.

Because of these factors, Jason Thornwallfs

testimony clouds Russell Thornwallvs alleged statement with the
indicia

of

untrustworthiness.

Accordingly,

neither

Jason

Thornwallfs nor the confidential informant's statements would have
been admissible at trial and would therefore not have affected the
outcome of the trial. The defendant's Jtotion is denied.
Counsel for the State is to prepare and submit a detailed
Order in conformity with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this o

day of March,/
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District Attorney for Salt Lake County
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEWTRIAL

-vsCaseNo.991910580FS
PETE VICTOR MONTOYA,
Hon. Timothy R. Hanson
Defendant.
The Court having presided over a jury trial and motion for new trial in this case,
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
1. On November 14,2000, a jury found the defendant, Pete Victor Montoya,
guilty of one count of Criminal Homicide, a first degree felony and two counts of
Attempted Criminal Homicide, second degree felonies.
2. On January 12,2001, the defendant was sentenced to five years to life for the
Criminal Homicide and one to fifteen years for each Attempted Criminal Homicide
count. Each count was issued consecutive to one another and an additional one year
consecutive was attached to each count for the use of a dangerous weapon.
3. Defendant moved this Court for a new trial on the basis that information
provided by Jason Thornwall and a confidential informant constituted newly discovered
evidence. A hearing, on the motion for new trial, was held on February 26, 2001. Defense

T>S1

counsel presented testimonial evidence and the Court listened to oral argument from both
parties.
4. Defense counsel presented the testimony of Jason Thornwall, the brother of
deceased co-defendant Russell Thornwall, and Dennis Couch, a Salt Lake Legal
Defender investigator. Jason Thornwall was questioned regarding exculpatory statements
allegedly made by the co-defendant, Russell Thornwall, to Jason Thornwall. Although
Jason Thornwall had this information at the time of the defendant's trial, he did not report
this to the police or any other individual until forty-five days after the defendant's
conviction.
5. Jason Thornwall testified that he did not initially report this information
because it incriminated his brother Russell Thornwall. Jason Thornwall further testified
that after his brother committed suicide he did not report these statements to any police
officer despite the fact that the defendant was his friend, that he was loyal to the
defendant and the fact that he held the belief that an individual should not suffer for some
else's misdeeds.
6. Jason Thornwall offered no corroborating evidence of this alleged exculpatory
conversation, nor could he state when the conversation took place other than it occurred
sometime prior to Russell Thornwall's wedding.
7. Jason Thornwall also testified that he was easily accessible through his family
members who knew him as a confidant to his brother Russell.
8. Dennis Couch, an investigator with the Salt Lake Legal Defenders office,
testified that he interviewed a confidential informant who indicated that he was at the
scene of the shooting in thefrontpassenger seat of the truck where the shots were fired.
9. Mr. Couch would not disclose the name of the confidential informant as
defense counsel and Mr. Couch promised the informant anonymity.
10. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court took defendant's motion under
advisement, to weigh the evidence and to consider the law.

3ST

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the memorandum of the parties, the arguments of counsel and
good cause appearing, the Court makes the following findings:

1. This Court finds that the Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Loose, 994
P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000), is controlling in the area of newly discovered evidence. The
Court sets forth the "legal elements for analyzing a claim for newly discovered evidence .
...: the moving party must demonstratefromthe proffered evidence that: (i) it could not,
with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial; (ii) it is not merely
cumulative; and (iii) it must make a different result probable at retrial Id, at 1241.
2. This Court finds that the defendant has failed to establish the first
element of reasonable diligence and the third element that this evidence would produce a
different result at retrial because the evidence in inadmissible hearsay.
3. The defendant possessed a number of options in pursuing the discovery
of the confidential informant, as well as, Jason Thornwall, but chose not to exercise those
options. The defense could have easily sought a continuance of the matter especially in
light of the fact that the state requested a continuance, yet the defendant concluded it was
in his best interest to go forward with the trial and thereby opposed the state's motion.
4. The defendant could have sought the assistance of this Court in
compelling the confidential informant's mother, who knew of the confidential
informant's whereabouts, to be deposed under oath.
5. The Court concludes that Jason Thornwall, Russell Thornwall's sibling
and confidant, was a natural source of investigation, particular in light of the additional
information provided by Natalie Thornwall. Jason Thornwall admitted that he was easily
accessible through his family members and could have been discovered prior to trial.

6. Therefore, through reasonable diligence the defendant could have
discovered and produced the statements of the confidential informant and Jason
Thornwall.
7. Additionally, the evidence offered by the defendant would not affect
the outcome of the trial because it is inadmissible hearsay. In particular the confidential
informant's testimony does not fall into the hearsay exception as an "unavailable"
witness, pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 804, nor does the statement arise to the
level of a "statement against interest," as the defendant has argued. The confidential
informant failed to personally asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, against self
incrimination, under oath, as required by State v. White. 671 P.2d 91 (Utah 1983), and
therefore cannot be considered "unavailable."
8. The confidential informant's statement, that he was thefrontseat
passenger, is not a statement against interest, as it does not admit to incriminating
conduct. Moreover, since the statement has been made under a blanket of anonymity, he
is not subject to criminal liability. Finally the defendant failed to produce any evidence
that would corroborate the confidential informant's statement.
9. Likewise, the defendant has failed to offer any evidence that would
corroborate the trustworthiness of Jason Thornwall's statement regarding Russell
Thornwall's admissions to him. Although the alleged statement may be considered a
"statement against interest," the delay in reporting his brother's statement to the police,
after his brother's death, makes such a statement suspect. While Jason Thornwall may
have felt prohibited from going to the police with incriminating information about his
brother, this prohibition clearly lifted with the death of Russell Thornwall. Furthermore,
despite Jason Thornwall's acknowledged belief that an individual should not suffer for
someone else's misdeeds, Jason Thornwall remained silent while the defendant, his
friend and an individual for whom he felt loyalty, was convicted and sent to prison.
Therefore, Jason Thornwall's testimony is untrustworthy.

10. Accordingly, the confidential informant's statement as well as Jason
Thomwall's statement is inadmissible hearsay and would therefore have no affect on the
outcome of the trial.
Based upon the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that/the Defendant's
Motion for New Trial is denied
DATED this J § _ day of May 2001.
BY7HECQI

Approved as to form:

Robin K/fjunefe&rg
Attorney for^tne defendant

